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Отбор продуктов, качество и реклама

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35. Lancaster K. Variety, Equity and Efficiency. New York : Columbia Univ. Press, 1979.
36. Leland H. Quacks, Lemons and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards // Journ. Polit. Econ. 1979. Vol. 87. P. 1328-1346.
37. Liebowitz S. Durability, Market Structure, and New-Used Goods Models // Amer. Econ. Rev. 1982. Vol. 72. P. 816-824.
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40. Nelson P. Information and Consumer Behaviour // Ibid. 1970. Vol. 78. P. 311-329.
41. Nelson P. Advertising as Information // Ibid. 1974. Vol. 81. P. 729-754.
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P. 217-234. 55 Shapiro C. Advertising and Welfare: Comment // Bell Journ. Econ. 1980. Vol. 11. P. 749-752.
56. Shapiro C. Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller Reputation // Ibid. 1982. Vol. 13. P. 20-35.
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