1. Abreu D. Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting: A General Theory. Harvard Univ., 1984.
2. Arrow K. The Property Rights Doctrine and Demand Revelation under Incomplete Information // Economics and Human Welfare. New York : Academic, 1979.
3. Aumann R. Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies // Journ. Math. Econ. 1974. Vol. 1. P. 67-96.
4. Aumann R. Agreeing to Disagree // Annals Statist. 1976. Vol. 4. P. 1236-1239.
5. Aumann R., Shapley L. Long Term Competition: A Game Theoretic Analysis. 1976. (Mimeo).
6. Banks J., Sobel J. Equilibrium Selection on Signaling Games // Econometrica. 1987. Vol. 55. P. 647-662.
7. Benolt J.-P., Krishna V. Finitely Repeated Games // Ibid. 1985. Vol. 53. P. 890-904.
8. Brandenburger A., Dekel E. Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge. 1985. (Mimeo). 9 Cho I. K. A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium. Princeton Univ., 1986. (Mimeo).
10. Cho I.-K., Kreps D. Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria // Quart. Journ. Econ. 1987. Vol. 102. P. 179-221.
11. Cho I.-K., Sobel J. Strategic Stability and Uniqueness in Signaling Games. Univ. of Chicago, 1987. (Mimeo).
12. Clarke E. Multipart Pricing of Public Goods // Public Choice. 1971. Vol. 2. P. 19-33.
13. Dasgupta P., Maskin E. The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games. I. Theory // Rev. Econ. Studies. 1986. Vol. 53. P. 1-26.
14. Dasgupta P., Maskin E. The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games. II. Applications // Ibid. P. 27-42.
15. D'Aspremont у., Gerard-Varet L. A. Incentives and Incomplete Information // Journ. Public Econ. 1979. Vol. 11. P. 25-45.
16. Debreu G. A Social Equilibrium Exictence Theorem // Proc. National Acad. Sci. 1952. Vol. 38. P. 886-893.
17. Farrell J. Credible Neologisms in Games of Communication. Mass. Inst. of Technology, 1985. (Mimeo).
18. Fraysse J., Moreaux M. Collusive Equilibria in Oligopolies with Finite Lives // Europ. Econ. Rev. 1985. Vol. 24. P. 45-55.
19. Friedman J. Game Theory with Applications to Economics. Oxford Univ. Press, 1986.
20. Fudenberg D., Kreps D., Levine D. On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements // Journ. Econ. Theory. 1988. Vol. 44. P. 354-388.
21. Fudenberg D., Levine D. Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games // Ibid. 1983. Vol. 31. P. 251-268.
22. Fudenberg D., Maskin E. Folk Theorems for Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information // Econometrica. 1986. Vol. 54. P. 533-554.
23. Fudenberg D., Timle J. Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information // Rev. Econ. Stud. 1983. Vol. 50. P. 221-247.
24. Fudenberg D., Tlrole J. A Signal-Jamming Theory of Predation // Rand Journ. Econ. 1986. Vol. 17. P. 366-376.
25. Fudenberg D., Tirole J. A Theory of Exit in Duopoly /'/ Econometrica. 1986. Vol. 54. P. 943-960.
26. Fudenberg D., Tirole J. Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview // Handbook of Industrial Organization / Ed. by R. Schmalensee, R. Willig. Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1986.
27. GalOr E. First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information // Rev. Econ. Stud. 1987. Vol. 54. P. 279-292.
28. Gibbons R. Incentives in Internal Labor Markets. Mass. Inst. of Technology, 1985. (Mimeo).
29. Green J., Laffont J.-J. Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods // Econometrica. 1977. Vol. 45. P. 427-438.
30. Grossman S, The Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality // Journ. Law a. Econ. 1980. Vol. 24. P. 461-483.
31. Grossman S., Perry M. Perfect Sequential Equilibrium // Journ. Econ. Theory. 1986. Vol. 39. P. 97-119.
32. Groves T. Incentives in Teams // Econometrica. 1973. Vol. 14. P. 617-631.
33. Harsanyi J. Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players // Management Sci. 1967-1968. Vol. 14. P. 159-182, 320-334, 486-502.
34. Harsanyi J. Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Points // Intern. Journ. Game Theory. 1973. Vol. 2. P. 1-23.
35. Holmstrdm B. Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective. 1983. (Mimeo).
36. Hotelling H. The Stability of Competition // Econ. Journ. 1929. Vol. 39. P. 41-57.
37. Kohlberg E., Mertens J.-F. On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria // Econometrica. 1986. Vol. 54. P. 1003-1038.
38. Kreps D. Signalling Games and Stable Equilibrium. 1984. (Mirneo).
39. Kreps D., Wilson R. Sequential Equilibrium // Econometrica. 1982. Vol. 50. P. 863-894.
40. Kuhn H. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information // Annals Math. Stud. Pririceton Univ. Press. 1953. ╧ 28.
41. Luce R., Raiffa H. Games and Decisions. New York: Wiley, 1957 (ТХУУЛЙК РЕТЕЧПД: мШАУ т. д., тБКЖБ X. йЗТЩ Й ТЕЫЕОЙС: чЧЕДЕОЙЕ Й ЛТЙФЙЮЕУЛЙК ПВЪПТ. н., 1961. - рТЙН. ТЕД.).
42. Maskin E., Riley J. Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Open and Sealed Bid Auctions. Los Angeles : Univ. of California, 1983. (Mimeo).
43. McLennan A. Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium // Econometrica. 1985. Vol. 53. P. 889-904.
44. Mertens J.-F., Zamir S. Formulation of Bayesian Analysis for Games with Incomplete Information // Intern. Journ. Game Theory. 1985. Vol. 14. P. 1-29.
45. Milgrom P. An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge // Econometrica. 1981. Vol. 49. P. 219-222.
46. Milgrom P. Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications // Bell Journ. Econ. 1981. Vol. 12. P. 380-391.
47. Milgrom P., Weber R. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding // Econometrica. 1982. Vol. 50. P. 1089-1122.
48. Milgrom P., Weber R. Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information // Math. Operations Research. 1986. Vol. 10. P. 619-631.
49. Moulin H. Game Theory for the Social Sciences // New York : Univ. Press, 1982.
50. Myerson R. Optimal Auction Design // Math. Operations Research. 1979. Vol. 6. P. 58
73. 51 Myerson R. Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive Compatibility: An Introduction // Northwestern MEDS Discussion Paper 548. 1983.
52. Myerson R. An Introduction to Game Theory // Discussion Paper 623. Kellogg School of Business. Northwestern Univ., 1984.
53. Nash J.-F. Equilibrium Points in N-person Games // Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. 1950. Vol. 36. P. 48-49.
54. Okuno-Fujiwara M., Postlewaite A. Forward Induction and Equilibrium Refinement. Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1986. (Mimeo).
55. Riley J. Informational Equilibrium // Econometrica. 1979. Vol. 47. P. 331-360.
56. Riordan M. Imperfect Information and Dynamic Conjectural Variations // Rand Journ. Econ. 1985. Vol. 16. P. 41-50.
57. Rubinstein A. Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion // Journ. Econ. Theory. 1979. Vol. 21. P. 1-9.
58. Rubinstein A. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model // Econometrica. 1982. Vol. 50. P. 97-110.
59. Saloner G. Predation, Merger and Incomplete Information // Rand Journ. Econ. 1987. Vol. 18. P. 165-186.
60. Schelling T. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard Univ. Press, 1960.
61. Selten R. Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfragetragheit // Ztschr. gesamte Staatswiss. 1965. Vol. 12. P. 301-324.
62. Selten R. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games // Intern. Journ. Game Theory. 1975. Vol. 4. P. 25-55.
63. Selten R. The Chain-Store Paradox // Theory a. Decision. 1978. Vol. 9. P. 127-159.
64. Shaked A., Sutton J. Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model // Econometrica. 1984. Vol. 52. P. 1351-1364. 65 Spence M. Market Signaling. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard Univ. Press, 1974.
66. Tirole J. Jeux Dynamiques: Un Guide de 1'Utilisateur // Rev. d'Econ. Polit. 1983. Vol. 4. P. 551-575.
67. Vickrey W. Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders // Journ. Finance. 1961. Vol. 16. P. 8-37.
68. Petrosjan L., Zenkevich N. Game Theory. Singapore-New Jersey-London : World Scientific Publ., 1996.