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Этот раздел сайта посвящен одной из фундаментальных экономических дисциплин - "Экономика промышленности" (Industrial organization) . Здесь Вы сможете найти различную информацию об этом предмете и его истории, найти полезные учебно-методические материалы, ссылки на интернет-ресурсы и многое другое.

Информация и стратегическое поведение

1. Alchian A. Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory // Journ. Polit. Econ. 1950. Vol. 58. P. 211-222.
2. Areeda P., Turner D. Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act // Harvard Law Rev. 1975. Vol. 88. P. 697-733.
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4. Bagwell K., Rainey G. Advertising and Limit Pricing. 1987. (Mimeo).
5. Bain J. A Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly // Amer. Econ. Rev. 1949. Vol. 39. P. 448-464.
6. Benoit J.-P. Entry with Exit: An Extensive Form Treatment of Predation with Financial Constraints // IMSSS Technical Report 405. Stanford Univ., 1983.
7. Benoit J.-P. Financially Constrained Entry in a Game with Incomplete Information // Rand Journ. Econ. 1984. Vol. 15. P. 490-499.
8. Bikhchandani S. Market Games with Few Traders: Ph. D. thesis. Graduate School of Business. Stanford Univ., 1986.
9. Bishop D., Cannings C., Maynard Smith J. The War of Attrition with Random Rewards // Journ. Theoretical Biol. 1978. Vol. 74. P. 377-388.
10. Bolton P., Scharfstein D. Long-Term Financial Contracts and the Theory of Predation. Harvard Univ., 1987. (Mimeo).
11. Bork R. The Antitrust Paradox. New York : Basic Books, 1978.
12. Balow J., Geanakoplos J., Kiemperer P. Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements // Journ. Polit. Econ. 1985. Vol. 93. P. 488-511.
13. Burns M. Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Costs of Competitors // Ibid. 1986. Vol. 94. P. 266-296.
14. Cho /.-/^-Equilibrium Analysis of Entry Deterrence: Reexamination. Graduate School of Business. Univ. of Chicago, 1986. (Mimeo).
15. Clarke R. Collusion and the Incentives for Information Sharing // Bell Journ. Econ. 1983. Vol. 14. P. 383-394.
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19. Edwards C. Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power // Business Concentration and Price Policy. NBER Conf. Rep. Princeton Univ. Press, 1955.
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26. Fudenberg D., Tirole J. Dynamic Models of Oligopoly // Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics / Ed. by J. Lesourne, H. Sonnenschein. London : Harwood, 1986.
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28. Gale D., Hellwig M. Incentive Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem // Rev. Econ. Stud. 1985. Vol. 52. P. 647-644.
29. Gal-Or E. Information Sharing in Oligopoly // Econometrica. 1985. Vol. 53. P. 329-343.
30. Gal-Or E. Information Transmission: Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria // Rev. Econ. Stud. 1986. Vol. 53. P. 85-92.
31. Gal-Or E. First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information // Ibid. 1987. Vol. 54. P. 279-292.
32. Gaskins D. Dynamic Limit Pricing: Optimal Pricing under the Threat of Entry // Journ. Econ. Theory. 1971. Vol. 2. P. 306-322.
33. Harrington J. Limit Pricing when the Potantial Entrant Is Uncertain of his Cost Function. Johns Hopkins Univ., 1985. (Mimeo).
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36. Hopenhayn H. A Competitive Stochastic Model of Entry and Exit to an Industry. Univ. of Minnesota, 1986. (Mimeo).
37. Joskow P., Klevorick A. A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy // Yale Law Journ. 1979. Vol. 89. P. 213-270.
38. Jovanovlc B. Selection and Evolution of Industry // Econometrica. 1982. Vol. 50. P. 649-670.
39. Kreps D., Milgrom P., Roberts J., Wilson R. Rational Cooperation on the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma // Journ. Econ. Theory. 1982. Vol. 27. P. 245-252.
40. Kreps D., Wilson R. Reputation and Imperfect Information // Ibid. P. 253-279.
41. Li L. Cournot Oligopoly with Information Sharing // Rand Journ. Econ. 1985. Vol. 16. P. 521-536.
42. Lippman S., Rumelt R. Uncertain Instability: An Analysis of Interfirm Differences in Efficiency under Competition // Bell Journ. Econ. 1982. Vol. 13. P. 418-438.
43. Mailath G. The Welfare Implications of Differential Information in a Dynamic Duopoly Model. Princeton Univ., 1984. (Mimeo).
44. Mailath G. Welfare in a Simultaneous Signaling Duopoly Model // CARESS Working Paper 85-29. Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1985.
45. Mailath G. Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types. Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1985. (Mimeo).
46. Maskin E., Riley J. Auction Theory with Private Values // Amer. Econ. Rev. Papers a. Proc. 1985. Vol. 75. P. 150-155.
47. Matthews S., Mirman L. Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand // Econometrica. 1983. Vol. 51. P. 981-996.
48. Maynard Smith J. The Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflicts // Journ. Theoretical Biol. 1974. Vol. 47. P. 209-221.
49. McAfee P., McMillan J. Auctions and Bidding // Journ. Econ. Lit. 1987. Vol. 25. P. 699-754.
50. McGee J. Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N) Case // Journ. Law a. Econ. 1958. Vol. 1. P. 137-169.
51. McGee J. Predatory Pricing Revisited // Ibid. 1980. Vol. 23. P. 289-330.
52. Milgrom P. Adverse Selection without Hidden Information // Working Paper 8742. Univ. of California. Berkeley, 1987.
53. Milgrom P. Auction Theory // Advances in Economic Theory: Invited Papers for the Fifth World Congress of the Econometric Society / Ed. by T. Bewley. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987.
54. Milgrom P., Roberts J. Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis // Econometrica. 1982. Vol. 50. P. 443-460.
55. Milgrom P., Roberts J. Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence // Journ. Econ. Theory. 1982. Vol. 27. P. 280-312.
56. Milgrom P., Roberts J. Informational Asymmetries, Strategic Behavior and Industrial Organization // Amer. Econ. Rev. Papers a. Proc. 1987. Vol. 77. P. 184-193.
57. Milgrom P., Weber R. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding // Econometrica. 1982. Vol. 50. P. 1089-1122.
58. Milgrom P., Weber R. Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information // Math. Operations Res. 1986. Vol. 10. P. 619-631.
59. Nalebuff ч., Zeckhauser R. The Ambiguous Antitrust Implications of Information Sharing. Princeton a. Harvard Univ., 1985. (Mimeo).
60. Nelson R., Winter S. An Economic Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard Univ. Press, 1982.
61. Novshek W., Sonnenschein H. Fulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and Release // Bell Journ. Econ. 1982. Vol. 13. P. 214-218.
62. Ordouer J,, Saloner G. Predation, Monopolization and Antitrust // Handbook of Industrial Organization / Ed. by R. Schmalensee, R. Willig. Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1987.
63. Ordouer J., Willig R. An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation // Yale Law Journ. 1981. Vol. 91. P. 8-53.
64. Ortega-Reichert A. Models for Competitive Bidding Under Uncertainty: Ph. D. thesis. Stanford Univ., 1967.
65. Ponssard J. P. The Strategic Role of Information on the Demand Function in an Oligopolistic Environment // Management Sci. 1979. Vol. 25. P. 243-250.
66. Posner R. Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective. Univ. of Chicago Press, 1976.
67. Posner R. The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis // Univ. of Pennsylvania Law Rev. 1979. Vol. 127. P. 925-948.
68. Riley J. Strong Evolutionary Equilibrium and the War of Attrition // Journ. Theoretical Biol. 1980. Vol. 82. P. 383-400.
6d. Riordan M. Imperfect Information and Dynamic Conjectural Variations // Rand Journ. Econ. 1985. Vol. 16. P. 41-50.
70. Roberts J. A Signaling Model of Predatory Pricing // Oxford Econ. Papers (suppl.). 1986. Vol. 38. P. 75-93.
71. Roberts J. Battles for Market Share: Incomplete Information. Aggressive Strategic Pricing and Competitive Dynamics // Advances in Economic Theory: Invited Papers for the Fifth World Congress of the Econometric Society / Ed. by T. Bewley. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987.
72. Saloner G. Dynamic Equilibrium Limit Pricing in an Uncertain Environment. Graduate School of Business. Stanford Univ., 1981. (Mimeo).
73. Saloner G. Predation, Merger and Incomplete Information // Rand Journ. Econ. 1987. Vol. 18. P. 165-186.
74. Salop S., Shapiro G. A Guide to Test Market Predation. 1980. (Mimeo).
75. Scharfstein D. A Policy to Prevent Rational Test-Market Predation // Rand Journ. Econ. 1984. Vol. 2. P. 229-243.
76. Scherer F. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. 2nd ed. Chicago : Rand-McNally, 1980 (ТХУУЛЙК РЕТЕЧПД: ыЕТЕТ ж. н., тПУУ д. уФТХЛФХТБ ПФТБУМЕЧЩИ ТЩОЛПЧ. н. : йОЖТБ-н, 1997. - рТЙН. ТЕД.).
77. Schmalensee R. On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The Realemon Case // Univ. of Pennsylvania Law Rev. 1979. Vol. 127. P. 994-1050.
78. Selten R. The Chain-Store Paradox // Theory a. Decision. 1978. Vol. 9. P. 127-159.
79. Shapiro C. Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly // Rev. Econ. Stud. 1986. Vol. 52. P. 433-446.
80. Telser L. Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse // Journ. Law a. Econ. 1966. Vol. 9. P. 259-277.
81. Townsend R. Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification // Journ. Econ. Theory. 1979. Vol. 21. P. 265-293.
82. Vives X. Duopoly Information Equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand // Ibid. 1984. Vol. 34. P. 71-94.
83. Wllliamson O. Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis // Yale Law Journ. 1977. Vol. 87. P. 284-340.
84. Wilson R. Reputations on Games and Markets // Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining / Ed. by A. Roth. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985.
85. Yamey B. Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments // Journ. Law a. Econ. 1972. Vol. 15. P. 129-142.